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NEW REMEDIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
ENFORCEMENT OF PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACTS FOR THE ENTERTAINMENT AND
SPORTS INDUSTRIES: THE RISE OF
TORTIOUS BAD FAITH BREACH OF
CONTRACT AND THE FALL OF THE
SPECULATIVE DAMAGE DEFENSE
Kevin W Yeam *
I. THE SCENARIOS
Samantha Starlet walks off the set during principal photography
stating she will not perform in this film until she gets better billing and
more money. Lionel Backer refuses to play this season unless the team
renegotiates his contract. The rock band, Heavy Mentals, delivers only
three records out of a promised five during its seven year deal with its
record company.
These scenarios apply equally in the areas of television production,
theater and book publishing. The talent have all signed personal service
contracts with their employers and are in breach thereof for willfully and
intentionally withholding their promised services. What are the legal op-
tions available against the breaching performer(s)?
II. INTRODUCTION
Personal service contracts are an inherent part of the entertainment
and sports industries. Performers and other talent contract to make
records, write books, play a sport and/or appear on film, tape or on stage
in exchange for compensation. Unfortunately, it is very common for per-
formers to refuse to satisfy the terms and conditions of their contracts.
In these situations, there are three principal remedies available to enforce
the personal service contracts against the breaching talent. They are:
* Kevin W. Yearn works at Hartman, Morton & Schlegel in Pasadena, California. Mr.
Yeam would like to thank Angela M. Rossi, Donald E. Biederman, and Mark Scarberry for
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(1) an injunction; (2) contract damages; and (3) tortious breach of con-
tract damages.
The purpose of this paper is to provide the entertainment and sports
management counsel with a practicum of alternative remedies for en-
forcement of personal service contracts against performers who willfully
refuse to perform all or part of their personal service contracts.
Specifically, the analysis shall discuss the basic contract remedies
applicable to personal service contracts including an overview of the area
of injunctive relief and the recent trend to allow recovery of damages
hereto considered speculative. Additionally, this paper examines the
courts' expansion of the theory of tortious bad faith breach of contract
and its potential application in the entertainment industry.
A. Background.
Traditionally, courts have held contract damage recoveries against a
breaching performer to be too speculative.' Further, a personal service
contract is not specifically enforceable.2 Therefore, the only remedy his-
torically available to management is a negative injunction.3 However,
courts have shown some reluctance to award such relief.4
Because of the lack of remedies available and the inherent uncer-
tainty involved in entertainment law, management is oftentimes forced to
renegotiate a personal service contract with the breaching talent despite
having a legal and binding agreement. However, recent developments
have expanded the well-settled areas of damages and tortious breach of
contract. These new principles should provide management with alter-
native remedies against the breaching talent and could potentially bal-
ance the power between management and the talent.
1. See generally J. B. Lippincott Co. v. Lasher, 430 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Wash-
ington Capitol's Basketball Club v. Barry, 304 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 419 F.2d
472 (9th Cir. 1969); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 192 P.2d 949 (1948);
Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969); Paramount Pictures
Corp. v. Davis, 228 Cal. App. 2d 827, 39 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1964); DeHaviland v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (1944); Rogers Theatrical v. Comstock, 232
N.Y.S. 1 (1928); Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423(5) (Deering 1984); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 526(5) (Deering
1972); 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTs § 1204 (1964); 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, at 2816 (1964). See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
3. See supra note I and accompanying text.
4. See Vanguard Recording v. Kineskin, 276 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Machen v.
Johansson, 174 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d 223, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1966); ABC Broadcasting Co. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 420 N.E.2d 363, 438
N.Y.S.2d 482 (1981); Rubin, The Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts, 3 ENT. & SPTS.
LAW, No. I at 3 (Spring 1984).
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III. REMEDIES
A. Injunctive Relief
The negative injunction is the most commonly used remedy in the
enforcement of personal service contracts.' In certain limited circum-
stances, it can be as effective as a mandatory injunction.6 Unfortunately,
such an injunction is more often of no practical or economic value to the
entertainment employer.
There are two limitations which restrict its usefulness. First, courts
highly scrutinize requests for negative injunctions because of their reluc-
tance to inhibit the talent's freedom to pursue a livelihood.7 In Califor-
nia, the negative injunction is even more difficult to obtain because of
statutory prerequisites as well as the standard Lumley requirements.'
This results in the courts denying many such injunctions.9 Second, man-
agement's primary concern is an economic return on the personal service
contract and not in preventing the talent's performance for others.' °
B. Damages.
Damages are recoverable against a breaching artist. Such include
the management's right to recover liquidated damages," advances12 and
pre-contractual reliance damages.' 3 However, courts have generally
been reluctant to award damages for lost profits in the area of entertain-
5. For a well argued example of entertainment employee negative injunction, see Bonner
v. Westbound Records, 76 Ill. App. 3d 736, 394 N.E.2d 1303 (1979); Rogers Theatrical v.
Comstock, 232 N.Y.S. 1 (1928) (negative covenant not to compete implied into every personal
service contract). See generally Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852).
6. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis, 228 Cal. App. 2d 827, 39 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1964).
7. Machen v. Johansson, 174 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Vanguard Recording v.
Kineskin, 276 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
8. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1971) (no negative injunction after seven years from
date entering into personal service contract); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (Deering 1984) and CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 526 (West 1979) ($6,000 yearly minimum guaranteed compensation for
personal service contract negative injunction).
9. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10. Rubin, The Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts, 3 ENT. & SPTS. LAW, No. 1 at
3 (Spring 1984).
11. Courts have enforced liquidated damages clauses in entertainment personal service
contracts. However, such a clause may show that the artist's breach can be compensated with
a monetary award. This can be used by the breaching performer in arguing that plaintiff has
an adequate remedy at law, and thus, bar a negative injunction. See Madison Square Gardens
Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924 (3rd Cir. 1937). Commonly, liquidated damages are set at an
amount equal to the additional compensation a breaching employee obtains from the new
employer, and not at a specific dollar amount. Rubin, at page 3.
12. J. B. Lippincott Co. v. Lasher, 430 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
13. Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Iil. App. 542 (1932); Anglia Television v.
Rees, 1971 3 All E.R. (C.A.).
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ment law.' 4 Although, the breach (as well as the proximate/foreseeable
injury to plaintiff) may be undisputed, the difficulty lies in the ability to
prove the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.' 5 The tradi-
tional view is that lost profit damages are speculative and non-recover-
able because it is impossible to predict the success of a film, play, record,
book or team with reasonable accuracy.' 6 Recently, however, courts
have begun to relax the speculative defense and allow a broader showing
of the certainty of injury.
17
1. Certainty of Damages.
Under the long settled rule of contract remedies, damages for breach
of contract must be clearly ascertainable and reasonably certain. Usu-
ally, the plaintiff carries this burden of proof.'" However, to avoid the
harshness of this rule, courts will shift the burden when the defendant's
wrong creates the difficulty in overcoming the uncertainty.19
14. See, e.g., Ericson v. Playgirl, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 850, 140 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1977);
Zorich v. Petroff, 152 Cal. App. 2d 806, 313 P.2d 118 (1957); Amaducci v. Metropolitan
Opera Ass'n, 33 A.D. 2d 542, 304 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1969). See also Zimmerman, Exclusivity of
Personal Services: The Viability and Enforcement of Contractual Rights, 19 BEV. HILLS B.
Ass'N J. 73 (1985); 2 SIMENSKY & SELZ, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 21.04, at 21-14 (1983). See
supra note 1 and accompanying text. For cases denying lost profit damages of an unestab-
lished business, see Fredonis Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA, 569 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978); Patton v. Royal Indus., 263 Cal. App. 2d 760, 70 Cal. Rptr. 44
(1968); Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610, 618, 112 A.2d 901, 904-05
(1955); Cramer v. Grand Rapid Showcase Co., 223 N.Y. 63, 119 N.E. 227 (1918).
15. See supra notes 1 and 14 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 15. See generally Jones v. San Bernardino Real Estate Bd., 168 Cal.
App. 2d 661, 336 P.2d 606 (1959) (plaintiff was denied damages for loss of contracts, business
associations, and clientele based on a breach of an employment contract and expulsion from a
local realty board); Quinn v. Straus Broadcasting Group, 309 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(the moderator of a radio talk show was denied damages for loss of publicity for wrongful
termination of an employment contract).
17. Welch v. U.S. Bancorp Realty and Mortgage Trust, 286 Or. 673, 596 P.2d 947 (1979).
The court in Welch stated "the term 'reasonable certainty' as a screening device may not now
be as favorable a concept for defendants resisting claims of lost profits as it once was under
older decisions of this court." Id. at 704-05, 596 P.2d at 963. For cases allowing lost profit
damages of a new business -venture upon a showing-of reasonable certainty,-see-S. -Jon Kreed-
man & Co. v. Meyer Bros. Parking-Western Corp., 58 Cal. App. 3d 173, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41
(1976); Vickers v. Wichita State Univ., 213 Kan. 614, 620-21, 518 P.2d 512, 517 (1979)
(breach of contract to televise college basketball games); Ferrell v. Elrod, 63 Tenn. 129, 469
S.W.2d 678 (1971).
18. D.C. Comics v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 5 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1020, at 164 (Kaufman Supp. 1980).
19. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946); M. & R. Contractors and
Builders v. Michael, 215 Md. 340, 348-49, 138 A.2d 350, 355 (1958); R. DUNN, RECOVERY OF
DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS, § 1.4, at 7 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 331(a), at
10 (1932).
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It is undisputed that management may recover damages if such can
be proven with reasonable certainty.2" The problem arises in the instant
scenarios when management attempts to prove that the breaching tal-
ent's absence led to and resulted in lost profits. There is a two step analy-
sis to recovering such damages. First, the talent's name and performance
must have value to the employer. Secondly, such loss must be measura-
ble with reasonable certainty.
It has long been stated that entertainment personal service contracts
are different from standard employment contracts.2' The name of the
performer and the attendant publicity related to his performance are val-
uable.22 The star uses this value to achieve greater bargaining leverage
against the employer. Alternatively, the management employs the per-
former's name and publicity for its "marquee value" and box office ap-
peal. The loss of the talent's performance is a manifest denial of the
employer's benefit due under the personal service contract. Therefore, it
is logical to conclude that the loss of the breaching performer's services
and name are a substantial detriment to management.
Once the employer establishes the fact of damage with reasonable
certainty, the mere difficulty in ascertaining the amount of damage is not
fatal.23 There is no requirement of mathematical precision. Rather, all
the plaintiff needs to show, using the best evidence available, is a reason-
able method of measuring the lost value of the breaching performer to
the employer.24
Management counsel should present all the supporting evidence ob-
tainable to demonstrate the talent's value to the employer and the
amount of the injury resulting from the talent's refusal to perform the
20. See supra notes I and 14-19 and accompanying text.
21. Clemens v. Press Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (1910).
22. See, e.g., Ericson v. Playgirl, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 850, 140 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1977);
Lloyd v. Cal. Pictures Corp., 136 Cal. App. 2d 638, 289 P.2d 295 (1955) (court sustained a
cause of action for breach of contract for denial of screen credit and granted the right to
recover for lost publicity and credit); Paramount Prods. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749 (1937) (plaintiffs recovered damages for breach of contract for plain-
tiff's screen credits for writing script used in a film). This principle has long been recognized
in England-see, e.g., Herbert Clayton and Jack Waller, Ltd. v. Oliver, 1930 A.C. 209 (an
actor engaged to play one of three principal leads was later cast in an inferior role. Court
stated plaintiff was entitled to lost publicity arising from the lesser billing); Marke v. George
Edwardes, Ltd., (1928) 1 K.B. 269 (C.A. 1927) (an actress promised credit and lead in a play
was awarded damages for lost publicity and denial of opportunity to perform).
23. Larsen v. A.C. Carpenter, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Tull v. Gunder-
sons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940 (Colo. 1985); Borne Chem. Co. v. Dictrow, 85 A.D.2d 646, 445
N.Y.S.2d 406 (1981); Vickers, 213 Kan. at 620, 518 P.2d at 517; RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 336, Comment d (1932); R. DUNN, supra note 19, § 1.4 at 7.
24. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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personal service contract. Producers, owners, management executives,
marketing/advertising experts and others can provide expert testimony
on the performer's public appeal and market value, as well as furnish
opinions as to the losses sustained because of the talent's absence from
the employer's end-product." Evidence of entertainment custom and in-
dustry practice, such as projected advertising and sales revenues, can be
offered to establish the performer's value to the employer. Also, the use
of statistical data to measure the popularity and public recognition of the
star can assist in proving the amount of damages.26 Evidence should be
offered concerning the value of plaintiff's product with and without the
breaching performer.27 The extent of damage can be shown by compar-
ing similarly situated performers.2" Lastly, the breaching talent's track
record of success can be used to predict the likelihood of plaintiff's future
lost benefits because of the talent's refusal to perform.2 9
Referring to the scenarios, management counsel can introduce the
25. See, e.g., M& R Contractors, 215 Md. at 349, 138 A.2d at 355 (which held that reason-
able certainty "may often be based upon opinion evidence"); Harsha v. Capital Say. Bank, 346
N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1984) (court allowed expert opinion regarding plaintiff's projected earnings
had defendant not breached); Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1, 390 P.2d 677
(1964) (court allowed expert testimony regarding the market structure for establishing dam-
ages). But see Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104, 121 N.E. 756
(1919).
26. Evidence concerning the scope of distribution of the work, such as television rating
surveys, circulation figures for newspapers and magazines, gross earnings for movies, and the
number of record albums sold, etc., might be considered a relevant factor in determining the
proper measure of damages. 2 SIMENSKY & SELZ, supra note 19, § 1.4, at 20-21. See, e.g.,
Paramount Prods. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749 (1937)
(plaintiff was allowed to introduce statistical evidence to show life expectancy and future earn-
ing potential); Smithers v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 139 Cal. App. 3d 643, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 20 (1983), vacated, -_Cal. 3d -, 696 P.2d 82, 211 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1985), withdrawn on
appeal. In Smithers, a 1985 unpublished and uncertified opinion, the Court of Appeal allowed
the introduction of the "television recognition quotient" (a publication which evaluates the
performer's recognition factor with the public) "to establish the extent of plaintiff's damage."
Ericson, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26 (value can be correlated to box office
appeal).
27. See Paramount Prods. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749
(1937) (plaintiff introduced evidence to show the difference in compensation before and after
the breach). Evidence concerning the before and after effect of the performer's breach,-such as
added revenues, attendance figures and box office gross receipts, might also be considered a
relevant factor in determining the proper measure of damages. A marketing device known as
"presale" (i.e.: the selling of exploitation licenses to movie before filming to defray production
costs) might be used to determine lost profit as the difference between the price paid with the
performer and the price without the performer. Meyer & Osman, Production Company Reme-
dies for Star Breaches, 1 ENT. L.J. 28 (1981).
28. Unruh v. Smith, 123 Cal. App. 2d 431, 267 P.2d 72 (1954).
29. See, e.g., Paramount Prods. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 749 (1937) (support of a claim for damages plaintiff offered evidence of similar personal
service contract to contrast the value plaintiff actually received). Ericson, 73 Cal. App. 3d at
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success record of Heavy Mental's last three albums to show it is reason-
ably certain that the fourth album would make plaintiff- employer a com-
parable amount of profit. Sports attorneys could establish the public
recognition and support of Mr. Backer by fan surveys and gate attend-
ance. Ms. Starlett's value to management can be proven by asking indus-
try experts the value of the film with and without her performance. All
or part of these proposed measurements can be introduced. No one par-
ticular piece of evidence is conclusive. Management must compile as
much supporting data as possible to be successful in proving the amount
of damages.
At least one court has recognized the need to expand the rule of
reasonable certainty in the area of entertainment law. In the 1985 uncer-
tified decision of Smithers v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,3" the court
held that a performer's name and its attendant publicity are valuable,
certain and compensable to the performer.3 Plaintiff-artist was entitled
to $500,000 damages for insufficient star billing. In rejecting the defend-
ant's certainty defense, the court stated "it is clear that one who willfully
breaches the contract bears the risk as to the uncertainty or the difficulty
in computing the amount of damage."32 A number of witnesses estab-
lished that the use of an artist's name has value.33 The court concluded
857, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26 (damages may be calculated in correlation to an artist's known
record of successes).
30. 139 Cal. App. 3d 643, 189 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1983). A hearing was granted by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court vacating this opinion. - Cal. 3d -, 696 P.2d 82, 211 Cal. Rptr. 690
(1985) (California Supreme Court retransferred the case to the Court of Appeals to be recon-
sidered in light of the recent decision in Seamen's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil of Cal.,
36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984)). In March 1985, the Court of
Appeals in an unpublished opinion reaffirmed its original decision adding only a brief discus-
sion of Seamen's and finding it inapposite to the instant matter. As of the time of this writing,
a petition requesting certification for publication in the official reporter is pending in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. For a detailed discussion of the Smithers decision by plaintiff's attor-
ney, see, D. Frank, What's in a Name? Maybe a Fortune! (1986) (unpublished manuscript).
31. 139 Cal. App. 3d 643, 645, 189 Cal. Rptr. 20, 22 (1983) (plaintiffs sued MGM for
breach of contract by failing to give plaintiff billing in accordance with plaintiff's personal
service contract; the jury awarded plaintiff $500,000 for defendant's breach).
32. 189 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (citing Donahue v. United Artists Corp., 2 Cal. App. 3d 794, 804,
83 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969)).
33. 189 Cal. Rptr. at 24. Fred Westheimer, of the William Morris Agency, testified the
recognition of an artist's name and money go hand-in-hand. Reporter's transcript in Smithers
trial (hereinafter referred to as "RT") 94:18-22. Chester Migden, former National Executive
Secretary of the Screen Actors Guild, stated the association of an actor's name to a particular
product is valuable. Further, he remarked the advertising industry pays very heavily for the
name of a star. RT: 359:3-18; 361:17-28; 362:1-11, 27-28; 363:1-4. Bert Remson, Casting
Director, told the court billing is money. RT: 386:28; 387:1-11, 16-19. John Conwell, former
Vice President in charge of talent for Quinn Martin Productions, testified he was unable to
estimate the probabilities of greater revenues, but in his opinion plaintiff would have earned
1987]
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that a jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence that plaintiff-artist
would suffer an economic loss because of defendant's breach, even
though no witness was able to precisely estimate plaintiff's damages.34
Even though Smithers and many of the herein cited authority are
considered "artist cases," the underlying factual and policy analysis is
arguably applicable to the scenarios which are the subject of this paper.
It makes no significant difference; plaintiff-artist's damages are lost future
earnings and plaintiff- employer's damages are lost product revenues.
Both factual situations essentially discuss the absence of the artist's name
from the employer's product due to a breach of contract and resulting
damages therefrom caused plaintiff. However, the courts have tradition-
ally favored the talent over the entertainment employer. This could ulti-
mately impede the employer's successful application of this new trend.
Smithers, albeit uncertified, is at the cutting edge of the recent trend
to relax the certainty rule. It, along with the other authority discussed
herein, establishes the courts' growing propensity to exercise their broad
discretion and allow more evidence regarding the certainty of damages.
There is clearly nothing esoteric about the relationship between a talent's
performance and the enhanced value the same has upon the manage-
ment's product. Management's counsel should focus on the lost benefits
of the bargain under the personal service contract by presenting all sup-
porting evidence obtainable to demonstrate the substantial value of the
talent's performance to the employer and the resulting injury from the
refusal to perform.
2. Avoidable Consequences.
The general rule states that a plaintiff is required to act reasonably
to mitigate damages.35 The defendant has the burden of proving plain-
tiff's failure to mitigate, or the amount plaintiff derived from
more money had he received star billing. RT: 427:23-28; 431:13-28; 432:1-7. Thomas Jen-
nings, theatrical agent, when called to testify, stated the greater a performer's name recogni-
tion means the more money the employer will pay. RT: 442:8-28; 443:1-22. John Randolph,
an-actor, stated-at-trial recognition and-income are inseparable, and- plaintiff suffers economic
loss for not receiving his promised billing. RT: 640:20-23; 647:3-7, 17-18; 650:7-8; 652:12-22.
34. 189 Cal. Rptr. at 24. Plaintiff's experts were unable to state exactly plaintiff's losses.
Rather, each explained on cross-examination the impossibility to provide specific and identifi-
able amounts but there was no doubt the absence of plaintiff's name in star billing detrimen-
tally affected plaintiff's ability to make more money.
35. See, also, Hardwick v. Dravo Equipment Co., 279 Or. 619, 569 P.2d 588 (1977); Placid
Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 244 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1957); Steelduct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer Co., 26
Cal. 2d 634, 160 P.2d 804 (1945); Sandier v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Corp., 141 N.J.
Super. 436, 358 A.2d 805 (1976); Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co. of Houston, 535 S.W.2d 740
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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mitigation.36
There is no case law which discusses an entertainment employer's
responsibility for mitigating damages when an entertainer refuses to per-
form under a personal service contract. Alternatively, the courts have
narrowly defined the entertainment artist's duty to mitigate.37 Practi-
cally, management's only mitigation options in the proposed scenarios
are (1) to replace the breaching performer; or (2) continue without the
talent. Because of the inherent individuality and uniqueness of every per-
formance, there is some question as to whether the employer has any
duty to mitigate, or if the artist is replaced, whether the substitute is truly
mitigating the plaintiff's losses.
There are cases, although outside the entertainment field, which
hold that if no replacement employee is available, there is no duty to
mitigate.3" There is no substitute when the item contracted for is
unique." 9 It is undisputed that the entertainment industry is based upon
the idea of the unique, extraordinary and special performance.' It is
equally logical to submit that such performers are not interchangeable.
The entertainment employer has a limited ability to mitigate. A su-
perior performer will cost management more money and still not neces-
sarily be better suited for plaintiff's particular need. Alternatively, an
inferior substitute or a continuation without a replacement will not sat-
isfy management's lost contractual benefits. Thus, the employer may
sustain damage regardless of its attempt to mitigate.
It seems there is a requirement if a replacement is available. The
measure of damages is the comparable difference between the value of the
substitute, if any, and the talent-defendant's promised performance
value.
36. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures v. Bumgarner, 197 Cal. App. 2d 331, 17 Cal. Rptr. 171
(1961) (court stated before the employee had a duty to mitigate, there must be a discharge or
repudiation by the employer of the personal service contract); Payne v. Pathe Studios, 6 Cal.
App. 2d 136, 44 P.2d 598 (1935) (where the employee is rendering non-exclusive services there
is no duty to mitigate); Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d
689, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1970). (The court held the employee's mitigation duty is only to accept
employment of a comparable or substantially similar nature.)
38. Unruh v. Smith, 123 Cal. App. 2d 431, 267 P.2d 72 (1954). But see, Lemat Corp. v.
Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969).
39. See, e.g., Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply Co., 98 Idaho
495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977); Homestake Mining Co. v. Talcott, 161 Cal. App. 2d 566, 327 P.2d
59 (1958) (mineral ore); House Grain Co. v. Finerman & Sons, 116 Cal. App. 2d 485, 253 P.2d
1034 (1953) (barley).
40. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423(5); Wilhelmena Motels v. Abdulmajid, 67
A.D.2d 853, 413 N.Y.S.2d 21.
1987]
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C. Tortious Breach of a Personal Service Contract.
1. Generally.
In every contract, there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.4 The recent trend is to find a bad faith breach of contract
which would constitute a tort. This new development provides prospec-
tive plantiffs with an alternative remedy to standard contract damages
and injunctions. The advantages of a tortious breach of contract are that
it provides a broader measure of damages,42 avoids some of the strict
uncertainty problems associated with contract damages,43 and opens the
entire cornucopia of tort remedies including punitive damages."
Although there has been an expansion in the area of bad faith
breach of contract, courts have been unable to establish a uniform stan-
dard for determining when a breach of contract is tortious. However, the
courts have recurrently held four types of conduct by breaching defend-
ants to be tortious. They are: (1) oppressive; 45 (2) egregious;46 (3) will-
41. See, e.g., , De Laurentiis v. Cinemagrafica de las Americas, S.A., 9 N.Y.2d 503, 215
N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961); 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 561 at 228 (1960).
42. To recover tort damages, plaintiff must show defendant's conduct proximately caused
his damage. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3300, 3301 and 3333 (Deering 1984); California
Shoppers v. Royal Globe Ins., 175 Cal. App. 3d 1, 221 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1985).
43. In the case of a particularly aggravated breach where the injured party has difficulty in
proving damages, the willfulness of the breach may be taken into account in applying the
requirement that damages be proven with reasonable certainty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 355 (1977) comment a. See Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 888, 208
Cal. Rptr. 394, 400 (1984).
44. The general rule is breach of contract damages are limited to pecuniary loss without
recovery for punitive damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 369 (1977). A
party is not automatically entitled to punitive damages for tortious breach of an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. "In order to justify an award of exemplary damages, the
defendant must be guilty of oppression, fraud or malice." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering
1984). He must act with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with conscious disregard of
plaintiff's rights. Id.
45. See, e.g., Knepper, Review of Recent Tort Trends, 30 Def. L.J. 1, 23 (1981), discussing
Golf West of Ky, Inc. v. Life Investors, Co. No. C 138 745 (Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles, July 10, 1980). In Golf, defendant terminated without cause an exclusive distrib-
utorship contract after-plaintiff spent two and one-half years and a substantial sum of money-to
establish outlets for defendant's product. The jury awarded 2.5 million dollars as compensa-
tory damages and 6.5 million dollars for tortious breach of an implied covenant of good faith.
See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) (the Seventh Circuit held
Indiana's oppressive breach of contract tort statute, which is similar to the tortious breach of
implied covenant of good faith, allowed punitive damages against the defendant who tried to
ruin plaintiff's business by attempting to force plaintiff to sell his business to defendant at a
reduced rate); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 907, 453 P.2d 551, 556 (1969) (the
court stated punitive damages for contract or tort can be found if there is fraud, malice, op-
pression or any other satisfactory reason for awarding such damages); Loom Treasures v.
Terry Minke Advertising Design, 635 S.W. 2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982). (The court allowed
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ful;4 7 (4) coercive conduct.4  The courts' stated policy reasons for bad
faith breach of contract decisions remain constant. Generally, the courts
seek to deter others similarly situated, provide a remedy for damages
which otherwise might go uncompensated and protect plaintiffs from se-
rious wrongs, tortious in nature, even though not predetermined torts.49
The entertainment scenarios fall into the aforementioned conduct
classifications and policy rationale, and thus should be accorded the simi-
lar protection of tortious breach of contract. The scenario talent willfully
breached their personal service contracts when the employers were most
vulnerable. The performers' intent was to exploit the enhanced bargain-
ing position and coerce modification of the valid and legally binding
personal service contracts. The plaintiff-employers' reliance upon recov-
ering contract damages is still relatively uncertain and a negative injunc-
tion would not solve the economic burden nor compel the contract
benefits. Therefore, management has two options: (1) surrender their
valid contractual rights under the personal service contracts, or (2) resort
to an arguably inadequate choice of remedies. Meanwhile, the breaching
performers avoid the performance required under the personal service
contracts or they enjoy the success of intentionally extorting additional
punitive damages when breach of contract is malicious, oppressive or fraudulent absent an
independent tort).
46. Kahal v. J.W. Wilson and Assocs., 673 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court held punitive damages and breach of contract were justified upon a showing
that the breach was aggravated by a particularly egregious conduct of the defendant).
47. See, e.g., Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt Assocs., 126 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 468 N.E.2d 414
(1984) (willful and wanton misconduct is an independent tort that will support punitive dam-
ages based upon the breach of contract); Robison v. Katz, 94 N.M. 314, 610 P.2d 201 (1980)
(the court will allow punitive damages in a contract action upon a showing of malice, reckless,
or wanton conduct by defendant); Henderson v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 620 F.2d 530
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 608 (1980) (the Fifth Circuit held punitive damages
could be awarded when defendant intentionally and willfully breached the contract).
48. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769-70,
686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984) (the court stated tort remedies are avail-
able in a contract action where defendant seeks to avoid all liability under a meritorious con-
tract by adopting a "see you in court" position without probable cause and with no belief in
the existence of a defense); In re Roy C., 169 Cal. App. 3d 912, 215 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1985) (a
party to a contract may be subject to tort liability, including punitive damages, for use of
coercion to gain more than is due under the contract); Davis v. Tyee Indus., 58 Or. App. 292,
298, 648 P.2d 388, 392 (1982), aff'd, 295 Or. 467, 668 P.2d 1186 (1983) (the court stated
defendant's behavior in breaching the contract bordered on extortion and amounted to a tort
of coercion); Adams v. Crater Well Drilling, 276 Or. 789, 556 P.2d 679 (1976) (the court held
that a party to a contract may be subject to tort liability, including punitive damages if he
coerces the other party to pay more than is due under the contract terms.)
49. Vernon Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349 N.E. 2d 173, 184-
85 (1976). See also Sassaman, Punitive Damages in Contract Actions-Are the Exceptions Swal-
lowing the Rule? 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86 (1980).
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contract rights. Whichever, the management needs the alternative of tor-
tious breach of contract to balance the scales in these scenarios.
2. Developments in California.
It is well settled in California that the law implies in every contract a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.50 The covenant requires that
neither party do anything which would deprive the other of the benefit of
the agreement.5'
In the recently decided landmark case of Seaman's Direct Buying
Serv. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. ,2 the California Supreme Court ac-
knowledged, albeit somewhat tentatively, that a non-insurance contract
could be breached tortiously if it contained "characteristics similar" to
those found in insurance contracts.53 The court intimated that a party
which coerces the other party to pay more money than due under the
contract terms, or attempts to avoid all liability on a meritorious contract
by stonewalling the validity of the contract without probable cause, of-
fends accepted notions of business ethics and engages in tortious
conduct.
5 4
In a subsequent decision, the court in Wallis v. Superior Court,55
considered the employee/employer relationship in light of the Seaman's
case. In Wallis, the court stated "the characteristics of the insurance
contract which give rise to an action in tort are also present in most
employer/employee relationships."56 The court held:
for purposes of serving as predicates to tort liability, we find
50. See, e.g., Gianelli Distrib. Co. v. Beck Co., 172 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 1035, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 203, 208 (1985); Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 362;
Wallis v. Super. Ct., 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1117, 107 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (1984); Quigley, 162
Cal. App. 3d at 887, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 399; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809,
818, 598 P.2d 452, 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 486 (1979).
51. See, e.g., Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362; Quigley,
162 Cal. App. 3d at 887, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
52. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d
1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
53. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769-71, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 _CaL Rptr. at 362-63 (ex-
tending the validity of the tort of bad faith breach of contract). See Commercial Cotton Co. v.
United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (1985).
54. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
55. 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
56. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1117 n.2, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127. This tort has also been
discussed in the context of wrongful termination cases. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App.
3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). See also Koehrer v. Super. Ct., 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr.
820 (1986).
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that the following "similar characteristics" must be present in a
contract: (1) the contract must be such that the parties are in
an inherently unequal bargaining position; (2) the motivation
for entering the contract must be a non-profit motivation, i.e.,
to secure peace of mind, security, future protection; (3) ordi-
nary contract damages are not adequate because (a) they do not
require the party in the superior position to account for its ac-
tions, and (b) they do not make the inferior party "whole";
(4) one party is especially vulnerable because of the type of
harm it may suffer and of necessity places trust in the other
party to perform; and (5) the other party is aware of this
vulnerability.
These criteria having been met, the party in the stronger
position has a heightened duty not to act unreasonably in
breaching the contract, and to consider the interest of the other
party as tantamount to his own.
5 7
Examining the hypothetical scenarios in light of the five-part test, it
is clear that the personal service contract between the entertainment em-
ployer and the breaching performer share substantial similarities with an
insurance contract.
In addressing the first element of the Wallis test, the court focuses
on the realities of the economic situation to determine whether the par-
ties are in an equal bargaining position. 8 At the time of the hypothetical
breach, management has sunk a huge investment in the product and per-
former. Further, plaintiff- employer has limited reasonable mitigation al-
ternatives for the breach. This is especially true if plaintiff- employer's
production will collapse without defendant's contractual performance.
Alternatively, the talent has little risk of legal reprisal from management
because of the inadequacy of employer's injunctive and contractual reme-
dies. Therefore, there exists a great disparity in the economic situations
and bargaining positions between the entertainment- employer and the
breaching performer.
Second, the plaintiff's motivation for the contract must be non-
profit. 59 However, this is a legal fiction. All contracts must be supported
57. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129. See Hudson v. Moore Bus.
Forms, 609 F. Supp. 467, 478 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
58. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
59. Id., at 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127. See Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 516,
209 Cal. Rptr. 559 (while the defendant-bank had a commercial purpose for accepting deposi-
tors funds, the plaintiff-depositor had a non-profit motive which was sufficient to justify finding
the contract to be non-profit motivated). See generally Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 819, 598 P.2d at
456-57, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87.
1987]
LOYOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
by mutual consideration to be enforceable. Whether called benefit, con-
sideration, security or peace of mind, a plaintiff is receiving a profitable
advantage under every contract. In Commercial Cotton,' a depositor
received valuable bank services, protection of his funds and convenience
of financial transactions in exchange for depositing funds in the defend-
ant-bank.6 However, the court held this to be a non-profit motive.62
Similarly, an insured is entitled to the services of an insurance agent,
protection against casualty and attorney services under an insurance con-
tract, but again the motive is deemed non-profit.63 All plaintiffs are thus
motivated to enter into the contracts by the valuable and substantial ben-
efits under the contracts. Courts have merely fashioned their arguments
to find a non-profit motive when the basic policies of tortious breach are
present and the court believes injustice will result if found inapposite.
Assuming the courts will supply a strict construction to the non-
profit motive element, the hypothetical personal service contracts have a
non-profit motivation. In Quigley,'M the court stated that there is a profit
motive when the reason for the contract "can be assured by ordinary
contract damages."65 However, courts have historically been reluctant
to award contract damages for breach of the entertainment personal ser-
vice contract by the artist. Thus, there is no assurance of recovering con-
tract damages.
In Wallis, the court stated that the non-profit motive exists when
"among considerations [for entering into a contract] is the peace of mind
and security it will provide .... ",66 An entertainment- employer is not a
non-profit venture. However, this is not a requirement. Plaintiff-em-
ployer must show some element of non-profit motivation. Management
does not make a profit directly from the personal service contract.
Rather, plantiff- employer absorbs substantial loss under the contract
with the intent to generate a profit from the end-product. Plaintiff-em-
ployer could obtain the same performance without a personal service
contract. However, the contract is motivated to secure the performance
of an essential artist before the employer makes a significant investment
into the project in reliance upon the performer's promise. Without this
security, the entertainment- employer cannot protect its future. There-
60. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 819, 598 P.2d at 456-57, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87.
64. 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394.
65. Id. at 893, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
66. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (quoting Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967)).
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fore, the purpose of the contract itself is to protect the plaintiff- employer
and is not solely motivated by profit.
As for the third element, contract damages are not adequate where
they offer no motivation whatsoever for the defendant not to breach.67
Tremendous uncertainty exists in obtaining negative injunctions or con-
tract damages. Further, an entertainment-employer cannot readily turn
to the marketplace to replace the talent because of the inherent unique-
ness of entertainment performers. As a result, talent commonly breach
their personal service contracts knowing that little, if any, legal reprisal is
available to plaintiff. Plaintiff's choices are to gamble on the traditional
remedies or be coerced into surrendering valid rights. Therefore, en-
tertainment- employers' remedies do not require the artist to account for
his actions and are inadequate to make plaintiff whole.
Fourth, there must be a trust between the parties resulting in one
party's vulnerability. 68 The law imposes on all employees an implied
duty of loyalty to the employer, 69 especially when the employee is essen-
tial to the employer. 70 Therefore, a trust relationship exists between the
entertainment-employer and the talent-employee.7 ' This is especially
true in the hypothetical scenarios. Due to the uncertainty of traditional
remedies, the entertainment- employer must trust the performer to render
the promised services because the talent has little motivation not to
breach. In reliance upon this trust, the entertainment- employer invests
time, effort and costs in preparation for the use of the performer's serv-
ices, thereby creating the vulnerability. Performers often will breach at
the time when employers expect the benefits of the personal service con-
tract. Thus, employers are extremely vulnerable because of the sunk in-
vestment, the lack of alternative remedies and the potential demise of the
entire project without defendant's perfomance.
Lastly, the performer must be aware of this vulnerability. 2 The tal-
ent not only is aware of the plaintiff- employer's precarious position, but
also intentionally breaches the contract at a time which maximizes the
exploitation of plaintiff- employer's vulnerability.
67. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
68. Id.
69. Hudson, 609 F. Supp. at 479; Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 249, 67
Cal. Rptr. 19, 22 (1968).
70. Dana Perfumes, Inc. v. Mullica, 268 F.2d 936, 937 (9th Cir. 1959); Hudson, 609 F.
Supp. at 479.
71. See generally, Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209
Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985) (the bank owed a quasi-fiduciary duty to depositor because of his reli-
ance upon bank's honesty and professionalism; this created a trust relationship).
72. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
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Once the court finds the criteria to have been met, the breaching
performer's extortion-like intent to manipulate the plaintiff and destroy
his enjoyment and benefit of the personal service contract is a breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendant has placed his
own interest so far ahead of plaintiff's interest as to offend standard busi-
ness ethics and one's own sense of justice. In support of the above analy-
sis and in application to the entertainment industry, the court in Smithers
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios73 (in an uncertified decision) held that a
threat to blacklist an entertainer unless he would forego his contractual
rights is a tortious breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. 4 This
case is analogous to the proposed scenarios save the reversal of the em-
ployer and talent as plaintiff and defendant. The defendant's threats to
blackmail the performer are tantamount to the breaching performer's in-
tentional withholding of his performance. The net result of both is that
the defendants are attempting to use their superior positions to force the
plaintiffs to surrender rights granted in valid personal service contracts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Historically, the body of entertainment and sports law favors the
artist, performer or athlete over the employer, whether the management
is a multi-national conglomerate or an independent owner. However,
talent in the 1980's has achieved more power and success hereto unparal-
leled by their predecessors. Because of this new power, star talent can
rival the most dominant of entertainment employers. Therefore, the old
rule of protecting entertainers is being eroded by recent trends to expand
management's remedies against breaching talent, thereby creating mutu-
ality of remedies which reflects the equality of power between employer
and talent.
The negative injunction has always had a limited usefulness to the
entertainment employer. It has minimal economic value to management
73. 139 Cal. App. 643, 189 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1983), withdrawn on appeal, - Cal. 3d __,
696 P.2d 82, 211 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1985) (the jury awarded plaintiff $300,000 on the tortious
breach of contract issue). This is an uncertified opinion and cannot be cited as authority as of
the time of this writing. A hearing was granted by the California Supreme Court vacating this
opinion. __ Cal. 3d __, 211 Cal. Rptr. 690, 696 P.2d 82 (1985) (California Supreme Court
retransferred the case to the Court of Appeal to be reconsidered in light of the recent decision
in Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984)). In March 1985, the Court of Appeal in an unpublished opinion
reaffirmed its original decision adding only a brief discussion of Seaman's and finding it inap-
posite to the instant matter. As of the time of this writing, a petition requesting certification
for publication in the official Reporter is pending in the California Supreme Court.
74. Smithers v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, __ Cal. 3d __, 696 P.2d 82, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 690 (1985).
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and is increasingly more difficult to obtain. Therefore, employers must
look elsewhere to achieve satisfaction under personal service contracts.
Traditionally, contract damages were too speculative in entertain-
ment and sports industry personal service contracts. However, a recent
trend to relax the speculative damages defense has allowed broader
showings of the fact and amount of injury. Management counsel should
introduce all evidence available in support of management's position and
incorporate the duty to mitigate into the damage analysis.
Tortious bad faith breach of contract may also provide management
counsel with an additional alternative remedy. Recent decisions have ex-
panded its definition and, as such, it could potentially be applied to the
hypothetical scenarios. However, the expansion of the remedy of con-
tract damages would render the necessity for this remedy moot except
for recovery of punitive damages.

